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Abstract
The massive accumulation of international reserves in developing economies
is a puzzling recent development in the world economy. This paper studies
reserve accumulation as the outcome of a simple model in which the central
bank smooths inflation. I explore the view that central banks accumulate
reserves to face large fiscal shocks that need monetary financing. Central
bank revenues are obtained through inflation, but inflation is distortionary.
As a result, the central bank optimally accumulates international reserves
in order to spread the costs associated with inflation over time. A simple
numerical exercise for an average developing economy using data between
1970 and 2009 yields fast growth of international reserves.
Keywords: inflation tax, exchange rates, international reserves, monetary
policy.
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1. Introduction
The last 20 years have witnessed a large increase in international reserve
holdings by central banks in developing economies. Figure 1 plots the evo-
lution of reserves for developed and developing economies as a share of their
GDP between 1970 and 2009.1 The most striking feature of this graph is
the divergence between the two groups of countries between 1987 and 2009.
Following a relatively stable period of reserves to GDP ratios close to 10%,
since 1987 developed economies have been reducing their reserves relative to
GDP . At the same time, developing economies have steadily increased their
international reserves relative to GDP to a level that exceeded 20% in 2007.
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Figure 1: Unweighted cross-country averages of International Reserves (minus gold) as a
share of GDP for 24 developed economies and 154 developing economies between 1970-
2009. Source: author’s calculations based on the World Development Indicators. More
details in Online Appendix C.
1International reserves are defined as liquid external assets under the control of the
central bank. This plot excludes holdings of gold.
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Why have central banks in developing countries increased their reserve
holdings, in contrast to their developed-country counterparts? This accu-
mulation has important implications. From the perspective of a developing
economy, it represents foregone consumption and investment in countries
with good growth prospects. From the perspective of the global economy,
reserves have played a role in the emergence of upstream capital flows - from
poor to rich countries - and contributed to global imbalances. This paper
takes a monetary view on this phenomenon and studies reserve accumulation
by a central bank looking to smooth inflation.
I set up the problem of a central bank that has to finance exogenous and
stochastic spending shocks with inflation. I interpret these shocks as banking
sector support during a banking crisis. The central bank is a Ramsey planner,
and maximizes the utility of the private agent. Inflation is distortionary and
therefore the central bank wishes to spread distortions over time. To do so,
it accumulates reserves in order to smooth inflation against these shocks.
Figure 2 shows the incidence of banking crises in the last 40 years. The
blue bars plot the frequency of banking crises in the world economy dur-
ing 5-year windows. These crises were particularly frequent in the last 20
years.2 Banking crises were also very costly. The numbers on top of the
gray bars represent the median fiscal cost of banking crises in percentage of
GDP for each 5-year window. A substantial fraction of these fiscal shocks
2Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) show that banking crises are not exclusive to the last
two decades. Between the late 1890 and the early 1930s there was a similar incidence
of banking crises across the world economy. They associate these events to increases in
capital mobility (see Figure 3 in their paper).
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Figure 2: Frequency of crises and median fiscal cost (gross, as % of GDP ; * crises ongoing)
between 1970-2011, for all countries. Measure for fiscal cost is only available for selected
crises and is cumulative. The median duration of a crisis in the sample is 3 years. Source:
Laeven and Valencia (2013). See Table 2 in Section 4.1. for available data on the portion
of these costs that needs to be financed with inflation related revenues.
are financed with inflation related revenues. Available estimates of inflation
related revenues amount to 10% of GDP , in episodes where the total fiscal
cost ranges between 15 and 65% of GDP (Burnside et al. (2001), Burnside
et al. (2006)). It is also possible to find examples of central bank support to
the banking sector that require the central bank to hold liquid foreign assets.
For example, in its 2008 annual report, the Russian central bank states that
”funds provided by the Bank of Russia to maintain banking sector stability
in September-December exceeded 9% of GDP”, and justifies the decrease
of international reserves with operations in the domestic foreign exchange
market, as well as with direct support to the banking system.3
3Looking at a larger sample between 1970 − 2011, Laeven and Valencia (2013) show
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Ultimately, what matters for the central bank are prospective crises, not
realized crises. In this paper I argue that, starting in the late 1980s, the
need to provide banking sector support in periods of crisis required a new
assessment of international reserves adequacy by central banks in developing
economies. Empirical research has noted the correlation between the size
of the financial sector and reserves. Lane and Burke (2001) are the first to
document the correlation between M2/GDP and reserves in a purely cross
sectional analysis. Obstfeld et al. (2010) perform a panel analysis and argue
that in developing economies larger M2/GDP has a positive causal impact
on reserves, and that managed exchange rate mechanisms are correlated with
reserves. Similar to my paper, they interpret reserves as highly liquid for-
eign savings to support the banking sector through bailouts while avoiding
currency depreciation.
The model predicts exchange rate behavior that is consistent with the
evidence. Large stocks of international reserves have been associated with
undervalued exchange rates. In the model, the central bank accumulates
international reserves resorting to inflation.4 As a consequence, the value of
that the median cumulative fiscal costs as a share of current GDP were 4.5% for advanced
economies and 10.0% for developing economies. They do not differentiate between fiscal
and monetary financed costs. They do show that developed economies rely more on
increases in public debt following a banking crisis, as the median increase in debt as a
share of GDP was 23.6% for advanced economies, and 10.2% for developing economies.
The authors also discuss monetary interventions such as monetary expansion and liquidity
support. Section 4 discusses the available data and gives more examples of central bank
support to the banking sector.
4The model abstracts from the role of sterilization policy, by assuming that domestic
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domestic currency decreases relative to foreign currencies. In other words, the
nominal exchange rate depreciates during the accumulation process. When
a crisis occurs, the central bank deploys its reserves to finance the banking
sector. This sustains the value of domestic currency and keeps the exchange
rate from collapsing. This is consistent with empirical work by Aizenman and
Sun (2012) and Dominguez et al. (2012). These papers show that countries
drew from their reserves during the 2008 crisis. Obstfeld et al. (2009) show
further that countries with larger international reserve holdings saw a smaller
depreciation of their currencies during 2008.
The view explored in this paper can shed light on the divergence between
the two groups of economies in Figure 1. Developed economies are less depen-
dent on international reserves because (i) they rely less on inflation related
revenues as the government can issue more public debt following a financial
crisis, and (ii) their central banks have access to contingent borrowing in
times of crisis. There is also substantial heterogeneity within countries that
accumulate reserves. Although most developing countries have accumulated
international reserves, Figure 1 masks substantial cross-sectional variation.
In the quantitative section of the paper I perform a series of exercises to study
the sources of cross-sectional variation in reserve accumulation. I find that
the most important determinants of the stock of international reserves are
the size of a crisis and the existence of borrowing constraints. The frequency
with which crises occur is less important. This indicates that countries with
debt and foreign debt are perfect substitutes for domestic agents. This implies that print-
ing money is always inflationary. See Brutti (2011) and Gennaioli et al. (2014) for open
economy models where domestic agents prefer to hold domestic government bonds.
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larger banking sectors and that have less access to external finance should
have more international reserves.
The recognition that reserve holdings are a crucial instrument for policy
in open economy models dates back to the literature on balance of payments
crises in economies with fixed exchange rates - notably, Krugman (1979),
Flood and Garber (1984) and Broner (2008). In these papers, the level of re-
serves determines the duration of an unsustainable exchange rate peg. Calvo
(1987) provides microeconomic foundations and studies the dynamics of bal-
ance of payments crises in an economy with maximizing agents that demand
money due to a cash-in-advance constraint. Subsequent work by Burnside et
al. (2001), Kumhof et al. (2010), Rebelo and Ve´gh (2008) and Rigobon (2002)
analyzes economic policy in this model. Although these papers study policy
where reserves are endogenously depleted, the accumulation of reserves is not
analyzed. The main differences in my paper are that I study an economy
that is not yet in crisis, and where the central bank takes into account the
magnitude of a prospective crisis and the distortions associated with inflation
when accumulating international reserves.5
5Burnside et al. (2001) argue that the Asian crisis of 1997 was caused by prospective
deficits associated with implicit guarantees to failing banks, to be financed with inflation
related revenues. The reserve accumulation model I explore in this paper shares the
same perspective on monetary policy. Faced with the possibility of future deficits, but
in a situation with strong economic conditions, a central bank accumulates reserves to
avoid future large swings in inflation and exchange rates. Kumhof et al. (2010) extends
the analysis to different ad-hoc inflation and exchange rate mechanisms to explore their
quantitative implications. Rebelo and Ve´gh (2008) study the optimal time to abandon
a fixed exchange rate mechanism. Rigobon (2002) studies the problem of a central bank
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A recent literature studies optimal accumulation of international reserves
as precautionary savings or insurance in order to smooth aggregate consump-
tion. This perspective, developed for example by Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009),
Durdu et al. (2009), Jeanne and Ranciere (2011) and Bianchi et al. (2014),
considers that developing economies depend on short-term capital inflows.
Countries accumulate foreign assets to sustain consumption when there are
negative output shocks and access to international financial markets is in-
terrupted, a view that has been synthesized by the Guidotti-Greenspan rule
(Greenspan (1999)). This rule states that the ratio of reserves to short-term
debt should be 1. This literature points to short-term debt as a crucial de-
terminant of reserves and obtains long-run mean levels of reserves consistent
with the data (Jeanne and Ranciere (2011) and Bianchi et al. (2014)). Turn-
ing to empirical work, Bussie`re et al. (2015) argue that short term debt is the
most significant metric for international reserves, while Obstfeld et al. (2010)
favor an interpretation based on financial stability and exchange rates.
The monetary perspective presented in this paper shares the view that
reserves are held due to insurance or precautionary motives. But there are
important differences with the consumption smoothing literature. I focus on
the problem of one big agent, the central bank, that interacts with the rest
of the economy. The central bank accumulates reserves in order to achieve
inflation smoothing, and to smooth the distortions associated with trans-
ferring resources within the economy. In this sense, my paper is closest to
the analysis of Aizenman and Marion (2004), who study political-economy
that draws from its reserves to reap benefits from a future fiscal reform.
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considerations in a model where a government decides between reserves and
distortionary taxation, and the literature on tax smoothing introduced by
Barro (1979). In Barro’s economy, the optimal tax policy is for the govern-
ment to smooth taxes over time. This policy is the consequence of convex
costs associated with distortionary taxes. I take this insight and embed it
in a open economy monetary model to study international reserve policy by
the central bank.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the monetary model
and describes the central bank problem. In Section 3 I solve for a determin-
istic example that allows for a closed form solution, and develop the main
intuitions of the model. Section 4 studies the quantitative predictions of the
model. Finally, Section 5 concludes and points to future research.
2. A monetary model of reserve accumulation
The model presents an economy where a representative consumer and
a central bank use a non-contingent bond to smooth exogenous stochastic
shocks. I focus on the the problem of the central bank. The central bank
dislikes inflation but has financial responsibilities in the form of foreign cur-
rency. To finance these, the central bank can use two instruments: (i) it can
raise inflation related revenues or (ii) it can withdraw from its international
reserves. Because inflation is distortionary, the central bank wishes to spread
the burden of inflation across time. As a result, it accumulates reserves in
non-crisis periods and when necessary, uses a mix of inflation and reserves.
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2.1. Setup
Consider a small open economy with one traded good. Time is continuous.
There are two maximizing agents: an infinitely lived representative consumer
and a central bank. At any moment in time, the economy is either in a crisis
state (H), or in a non-crisis state (L). The difference between the two is the
amount of funds demanded from the central bank to support the government.
For simplicity, I assume these resources are not transferred back to domestic
agents. I now describe the problem of each agent in this economy.
The representative consumer maximizes the expected lifetime utility from
the consumption plan {ct}∞0 . The objective function of the consumer is given
by:
E0
∫ ∞
0
ln (ct) e
−βtdt (1)
where β > 0 is the consumer’s subjective discount factor. I assume it to
be equal to the foreign real interest rate ρ. The consumer can invest in
an inflation index domestic bond, in a risk free foreign bond or in money
holdings. The foreign bond earns the foreign real interest rate ρ, that is
assumed to be constant. Given that domestic bonds are inflation indexed,
domestic and foreign debt are perfect substitutes for the consumer. Let
f represent the total amount of domestic and foreign bond holdings. The
consumer has log-utility and therefore just rolls over his initial wealth. These
assumptions simplify the consumer’s portfolio decision in order to focus on
the problem of the central bank. The consumer can also invest in money
holdings Mt. Money is introduced in this economy through a cash-in-advance
constraint on consumption. This asset is useful for consumption purposes,
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but loses value with inflation. The opportunity cost of holding money is
given by the nominal interest rate, which corresponds to the loss of value
due to inflation plus the foregone return from not saving in the foreign bond.
Let Pt be the domestic price level at t. The domestic inflation rate is
given by pit = P˙t/Pt, and assume the international inflation rate to be zero.
Throughout, I assume that purchasing power parity holds (PPP ) such that
the exchange rate is determined by inflation. Given that all debt is indexed to
domestic inflation, the nominal domestic interest rate is given by: it = ρ+pit.
The flow budget constraint of the consumer can be written as f˙t +
M˙t
Pt
=
ρft + y − ct.
Additionally, the consumer faces a cash-in-advance constraint. To con-
sume αct units of the consumption good, he must have real money holdings
Mt
Pt
at least larger than αct, where α is the proportion of consumption paid
with money. The cash-in-advance constraint is given by:
αct ≤ Mt
Pt
(2)
Define at = ft+
Mt
Pt
as the wealth of the consumer in real terms. Because
consumers only care about real balances, define real money balances as mt =
Mt
Pt
. As a store of value, money is always dominated by foreign assets if
it = pit + ρ ≥ 0, which I assume throughout. Thus, the cash-in-advance
constraint (2) will always hold with equality and money demand is given by
mt = αct. I can then rewrite the flow budget constraint as
a˙t = ρat + y − (1 + αpit + αρ) ct (3)
Finally, the consumer’s solvency condition is given by:
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lim
t→∞
ate
−βt ≥ 0 (4)
The problem of the consumer is then to choose a sequence of {ct}∞0 , {at}∞0 ,
so as to maximize (1), subject to the flow budget constraint (3) and the sol-
vency condition (4), given {pit}∞0 , f0, y and m0. Under these assumptions,
the solution to the consumer’s problem is given by:
ct =
y + ρa0
1 + αpit + αρ
mt = α
y + ρa0
1 + αpit + αρ
(5)
The intuition behind equations (5) is the following. Under log-utility the
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is 1. If β = ρ the consumer is just
as patient as the international market. Therefore, the consumer spends the
same amount of resources y+ρa0 in every period to finance his consumption
expenditures (1 + αpit + αρ)ct , independently of the cost of consumption at
t. In this simple setting, the elasticity of savings to the interest rate is zero.
For a given inflation policy, this model is a traditional small open economy
model and can be used to study consumption and capital flows. In this paper,
I am interested in optimal inflation policy and reserve management, and their
implications for the aggregates in the economy. We now turn to the problem
of the central bank.
2.2. The central bank problem
I assume the central bank to be benevolent. It solves a constrained opti-
mization problem: subject to the demands of the government, the consumer’s
choices and it’s own budgetary constraints, the central bank maximizes the
11
representative consumer’s utility. The solution is represented by a time-
consistent contingent plan for the inflation rate {pit}∞0 that maximizes (1).
The central bank can tax the consumer through inflation. With the re-
sources obtained from seigniorage
·
Mt/Pt, the central bank can pay for bank-
ing sector support gt or accumulate net international reserves rt that earn
interest ρ. Absent any borrowing constraint, the central bank can also borrow
from the international bond market at rate ρ. Therefore, reserves rt capture
the net foreign position of the central bank. However, since this asset is not
contingent on shocks to gt, the central bank does not have access to perfect
insurance. The external budget constraint of the central bank is given by:
·
rt = ρrt +
·
Mt/Pt − gt. Given that
·
Mt/Pt =
·
mt + pimt, we can rewrite this
constraint as
·
rt = ρrt +
·
mt + pitmt − gt.
In exchange for the financing gt the central bank gets domestic debt bt,
either issued by the government or from financial institutions. The balance
sheet of the central bank is then given as: bt + rt = mt, where bt + rt are
the assets, and mt corresponds to its liabilities. The budget constraint of the
central bank can be rewritten as:6
·
bt = ρbt + gt − (pit + ρ)mt (6)
The central bank may face a constraint on how much debt it can issue
abroad. I introduce this through an exogenous borrowing constraint given
by rt ≥ r = 0. Note that this constraint is on central bank issued debt and
6Further details can be found in the Online Appendix A.1. The focus on a fully backed
money supply is done for analytical convenience and is not crucial for the results in this
paper.
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should not be confused with the government or the financial sector external
funding constraints.
Note that the assumptions of PPP, indexed debt and perfect capital mo-
bility imply that choosing inflation pit is the same as choosing it. Since
international inflation is zero, exchange rate depreciation tracks one to one
the inflation rate. That is, when inflation increases, the value of the domes-
tic currency loses value and the exchange rate depreciates. When choosing
the inflation rate, the central bank takes into account the impact of its de-
cisions on the representative consumer. In particular, the solution to the
representative consumer problem given by (5) is a constraint in the optimal
policy problem of the central bank. The central bank is effectively a Ramsey
planner.
Absent any spending demands gt, the optimal policy of an unconstrained
central bank is given by the Friedman rule, with it = 0 and pit = −ρ. How-
ever, gt will occasionally be large and the central bank will have to resort to
inflation. To keep the analysis simple, I study the case where gt takes one of
two values {gL, gH}, and evolves according to the following Poisson process:
gt+dt =

gL w.p. 1− qLdt if gt = gL
gH w.p. qLdt if gt = gL
gH w.p. 1− qHdt if gt = gH
gL w.p. qHdt if gt = gH
(7)
This economy will be in one of two states of nature, defined by gH >> gL.
At any non-crisis period, a crisis arrives with probability qL and leaves with
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probability qH . Because crises are relatively less frequent than safe periods,
qH >> qL. This framework captures in a parsimonious way the type of
shocks that I am studying: infrequent but severe crisis. We are now ready to
study the optimal policy problem. At any t, the central bank takes as given
a0 and b0 and solves:
max
{pit}
E0
∫ ∞
0
ln (ct) e
−ρtdt
s.t.
·
bt = ρbt + gt − (pit + ρ)mt
ct =
y + ρa0
1 + αpit + αρ
mt = α
y + ρa0
1 + αpit + αρ
rt = mt − bt
lim
T→∞
bT e
−ρT = 0, a0, b0 given
gt given by (7)
rt ≥ r
Suppose the economy starts in a period with low gt, but the central
bank knows it might face a crisis soon, and an increase in gt. Faced with
a banking crisis the central bank can either print money or draw from its
reserves. Printing money causes inflation which decreases consumption, but
the consumer has a concave utility. It follows that the optimal policy of the
central bank is to smooth inflation.
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The extent to which it can smooth inflation depends on the existence of
constraints on how much the central bank can borrow abroad. If the central
bank is unconstrained, the crisis will be financed mostly with future revenues
and the central bank need not accumulate many reserves. On the other hand,
if there is a constraint, this limits the amount of future revenues a central
bank can transfer to the crisis period thus increasing precautionary savings
ex-ante.7
The optimal policy problem can be described with two value functions,
one for each state j = L,H, subject to the relevant constraints. Given state
j, the relevant state variable of the economy is summarized by bt. There are
four constraints in the central bank problem. First, the budget constraint
which is summarized by equation (6). Second, the borrowing constraint on
reserves rt ≥ r. Finally, the optimal decisions of the consumer given by (5).
I represent the problem using the following value functions, where I omit the
subscripts t and the state variables to simplify notation:
7In the model, foreign reserves are net of foreign debt of the central bank. There are
some cases of central banks issuing debt and accumulating reserves - for example, the
Monetary Stabilization Bonds issued by the Bank of Korea in 2004, and the establishment
of emergency swap lines between central banks during the 2008 crisis. Note also that
throughout the debt position of the fiscal authority is taken as given and the paper makes
no statement about the public sector’s net foreign asset position. For theoretical papers
on the public sector’s gross and net foreign asset positions see Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009)
and Bianchi et al. (2014). See Broner et al. (2013) and Forbes and Warnock (2012) for
empirical works on the behavior of gross flows.
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ρV L = max
piL
ln
(
y + ρa0
1 + αpiL + αρ
)
+ V Lb
(
ρb+ gL −
(
α
(
piL + ρ
)
(y + ρa0)
1 + αpiL + αρ
)
+ qL ·
(
V H − V L)
(8)
for the low expenditure state, and
ρV H = max
piH
ln
(
y + ρa0
1 + αpiH + αρ
)
+ V Hb
(
ρb+ gH −
(
α
(
piH + ρ
)
(y + ρa0)
1 + αpiH + αρ
)
+ qH ·
(
V L − V H)
(9)
for the high expenditure state, where V j is the value function of the central
bank for states j = {L,H} with boundary conditions: limb→−∞ ij = − 1α −
ρ. The Online Appendix A.2 describes the details of the solution to this
problem. It shows that if r = −∞ this problem can be rewritten as the
solution of the following system of differential equations:
∂piL
∂b
=
qL
(
piL − piH)
ρb+ gL − (piL + ρ)
(
α y+ρa0
1+αpiL+αρ
)
∂piH
∂b
=
qH
(
piH − piL)
ρb+ gH − (piH + ρ)
(
α y+ρa0
1+αpiH+αρ
)
lim
b→−∞
piL = − 1
α
− ρ lim
b→−∞
piH = − 1
α
− ρ
(10)
If r 6= −∞ there is an additional boundary condition. When reserves hit
the constraint, the central bank is forced to float and to finance all gt with
current inflation revenues. In the setting considered in this paper this will
only happen in the high state. The problem given by equation (9) is then
augmented with the constraint: piHt ≥ piH , where
(
piH , b
)
is the solution to:
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y + ρa0
1 + αpiH + αρ
= gH + ρb
y + ρa0
1 + αpiH + αρ
= b+ r
This problem does not admit a closed form solution and in Section 4 I
explore the quantitative implications of the model. Before, the next section
develops intuitions resorting to a deterministic example.
3. Building intuitions
3.1. Deterministic example
To make the trade-offs associated with reserve management clear, I focus
on a deterministic example that admits a closed form solution. In particular,
consider that the expenditure process can be summarized by the following
expression:
gt+dt =

0 if t < t1
g if t1 ≤ t ≤ t2
0 if t > t2
(11)
that is, at t = 0, the central bank learns that an increase in spending will
occur between t1 and t2. Faced with this new information, the central bank
must reexamine the adequacy of its current reserve stocks. To simplify the
analysis, assume further that α = 1.
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3.2. No constraint on reserves
Define a balanced budget inflation rate as the policy from a naive central
bank that contemporaneously finances gt with inflation. That is, where
·
bt =
0. In this policy reserve holdings will not be optimal and there will be
fluctuations in crucial variables such as consumption and the inflation rate.
Because it implies flexible exchange rates, I also refer to it as the ”flexible
benchmark”. I will represent the flexible inflation rate as pif , for flexible.
Replacing the optimal decision of the consumer on the central bank budget
constraint:
·
bt = ρbt + gt − y+ρa01+ρ+pit (ρ+ pit) , ∀t, which can be rewritten as:
1
1 + ρ+ piLf
= 1− ρb0
y + ρa0
>
1
1 + ρ+ piHf
= 1− g + ρb0
y + ρa0
, (12)
If the policy of the central bank is to finance government spending only
through contemporaneous inflation, then consumption and reserves fluctuate
with government spending. For each j = L,H and all t:
cjt = y + ρa0 −
(
gjt + ρb0
)
(13)
rjt = y + ρa0 −
(
gjt + ρb0
)− b0 (14)
Equation (12) shows that the domestic interest rate is larger in periods
when gt is large, which translates into larger inflation. Equation (13) shows
that consumption is lower in these periods. The path of these variables is
plotted in Figure 3. In this economy, the central bank increases inflation
in periods with high expenditure, and decrease inflation in periods with low
expenditure. Inflation is very volatile and reserves are completely deter-
mined by initial conditions and the state of the economy. Because inflation
18
is distortionary and distortions have convex costs, the higher the volatil-
ity of inflation, the higher are the welfare costs associated with the naive
flexible policy. A central bank behaving optimally steers away from large
and volatile inflation. It chooses reserves in order to stabilize inflation, and
minimize distortions and welfare costs.
To show this, I first assume that there is no constraint on borrowing by
the central bank (r = −∞) and then that reserves can never be negative
(r = 0).8 Since the crisis is expected and there is no constraint on reserves,
the optimal solution is to have a constant interest rate. This yields an optimal
ct that is constant:
c∗ = y + ρa0 − ρ (G+ b0) (15)
pi∗ =
ρ (G+ b0)
y + ρa0 − ρ (G+ b0) − ρ (16)
where G is the present value of expenditure, G = ρ−1 (e−ρt1 − e−ρt2) g.
The (constant) inflation tax will depend on the amount of resources that
need to be financed and on the initial wealth of the central bank. Further-
more, it will depend on how wealthy the representative consumer is. Figure
3 plots the solution of the model.9 It is possible to see that the optimal solu-
tion to an expected crisis when there is no borrowing constraint is to smooth
8The detailed solution for the case without a borrowing constraint can be found in the
Online Appendix B.1.
9These figures are computed with the following parameterization: ρ = β = 0.05, y = 23 ,
a0 = −0.55, gL = 0, gH = 0.1, b0 = 0.5, bf1 = 0.5135, r0 = 0.1. The timing of the crisis is
the following: gt = gH between t1 = 5 and t2 = 10, and gt = gL = 0 elsewhere.
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Figure 3: The qualitative benefits of reserve management: the unconstrained economy
under balanced budget (f) and optimal inflation rates (∗) faced with a predictable increase
in expenditure.
inflation perfectly. Inspecting the lower panels shows that this is achieved
with a constant and positive inflation rate. The upper right panel shows
the behavior of reserves (r). Initially, the central bank accumulates some
reserves to face the crisis, but around t = 7, starts borrowing from abroad.
Once the crisis is over, the central bank keeps reserves constant.
Consider two alternative policies. First assume that the central bank
wishes to keep reserves always constant. Before t1 we have that g = 0 so
the inflation rate that implements this policy is the same as in the flexible
benchmark: piLf . What about once g is positive? To keep reserves constant
and still pay for g, the central bank needs now to inflate the economy further,
even more than piHf . Once g goes back to zero, the central bank drastically
reduces the inflation rate and gradually increases it back to a constant level.
A policy of constant reserves is therefore qualitatively similar to a flexible
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policy, except that it translates into even larger fluctuations in inflation and
consumption, and therefore, into larger welfare costs.
Assume now that the central bank would like to implement a fixed ex-
change rate policy. Under a fixed exchange rate, pit = 0 and it = ρ. Under
this policy consumption is also constant at cfixed = y+ρa0
1+ρ
. It remains to see
if this policy is feasible. Given cfixed = y+ρa0
1+ρ
, and integrating the budget
constraint, it is possible to obtain that bt =
(
b0 +G− y+ρa01+ρ
)
eρt. Under the
no-ponzi game condition the central bank is not allowed to announce a policy
where it never pays back, in other words, limT→∞ bT e−ρT ≤ 0, which would
be violated if b0 + G >
y+ρa0
1+ρ
. As a result, the fixed exchange rate policy
would only be possible to implement for a limited amount of time. In this
sense, the discussion of a fixed exchange rate mechanism is similar to the
analysis under a constraint on reserves, which we turn to next.10
3.3. Constraint on reserves
Adding a constraint on reserves creates an additional incentive to accu-
mulate reserves before the crisis. The solution is depicted in Figure 4.11 The
constraint puts a limit on the amount of future revenues that can be trans-
ferred to the crisis period. This justifies the jump in consumption, interest
rate and inflation when gt reverts back to 0. Now that the crisis is over the
central bank does not need inflation revenues anymore. In fact, the central
bank would rather have raised some revenue in these periods, and trans-
10On the contrary, if b0 + G <
y+ρa0
1+ρ , this policy would be feasible. Clearly, it would
violate the transversality condition for optimality. The optimal policy in this case would
be a permanent deflation.
11The constrained case is solved in the Online Appendix B.2.
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Figure 4: Qualitative comparison between the constrained and the unconstrained
economies.
ferred it to the crisis period. But it can not do this because of the borrowing
constraint.
Reserve accumulation is represented in the upper right panel, and is plot-
ted against the case without a borrowing constraint. The central bank still
wishes to smooth inflation. Because it can not transfer future revenues to the
crisis period, it must transfer more present revenues. For this reason, reserves
in the constrained case are larger. As a consequence, in the constrained case
inflation (and exchange rate depreciation) is larger in the moments preceding
the crisis, but smaller when the crisis is over.12
12A costlier crisis would see the central bank accumulate more reserves. In this simple
deterministic setting, a larger crisis is similar to having larger distortions in the general
model. This is the case because in the general model, the expected cost of a crisis depends
on the size of the crisis but also on the distortions caused by inflation. If distortions are
large, the central bank will have a larger desired level of international reserves.
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4. Numerical Illustration
In this section I compare the predictions of the model with the data on
international reserves. I perform a series of quantitative exercises using data
from the period 1970− 2011. First, I study an average developing economy.
I perform the following experiment: a central bank learns at T = 1987 that
the costs of a banking crisis that have to be financed with inflation related
revenues have increased. This happened after many years where costs were
low. I assume that no other parameter of the economy changed. Faced with
the emergence of costlier crises, the central bank needs to reevaluate the ad-
equacy of its reserves stock. I choose 1987 because this is when the average
levels of reserves between developed and developing economies start to di-
verge. It also coincides with a wave of financial liberalization and anticipates
an increase in the frequency of banking crises as shown in Figure 2.13
I will focus on the average level of reserves obtained after 20 years, de-
pending on different assumptions for parameter values. In a simulation, I
show that the build up in reserves is relatively fast. I also show that inflation
and exchange rate depreciation are the mirror image of international reserve
accumulation. As the stock of international reserves increases, inflation is
ever smaller and the exchange rate depreciates. If a crisis hits, the central
banks uses a mix of inflation and reserves to finance the necessary expendi-
tures. The larger the reserve holdings at the moment of the crisis, the smaller
is the increase in inflation.
13Note that 1987 is not a special date. A more detailed exercise would try to match
precisely the reserve accumulation process for a particular country.
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Furthermore, I investigate the effect of the frequency of crises and con-
straints on borrowing by the central bank. More frequent crises do not greatly
increase the level of reserves. This is intuitive. If a crisis hit every period,
then crises were already smooth and there is no role for reserve policy. Re-
serves are most useful when crises are rare and large. Borrowing constraints,
however, play an important role. Contingent borrowing is a substitute for
reserve accumulation. The more a central bank can borrow from abroad, the
smaller will be reserve accumulation.
4.1. An average developing economy
In Table 1 I report values for the parameters used in the baseline case.
The parameter for the real interest rate ρ corresponds to the US 3-month
T-Bill 1970-2010 average. I compute the probability of a crisis qL as the
probability of experiencing a banking crisis conditional on not being in a
banking crisis. Using the data from Laeven and Valencia (2013) I obtain
3.7% for developing economies, and 3.8% for the full sample, which I round
up to 4%. The parameter governing the probabilistic end of the crisis qH is
computed to match the median duration of a banking crisis in developing
economies of 2 years. To calibrate a0 I compute average wealth in developing
economies in 1987 and subtract central bank reserves. Wealth is computed as
the sum of capital stocks and net foreign assets. Capital stocks are computed
using the perpetual inventory method and data from the Penn World Table
Version 6.2 (Heston et al. (2006)), while net foreign assets are obtained from
the database on the External Wealth of Nations by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007). Finally, I calibrate α = 0.22 obtained from the sample mean for
developing countries in 1987 as α = m/c.
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Value Description Source
4g 10% GDP Central bank financing Burnside et al. (2006)
a0 110.5% GDP Net Wealth -Reserves Sample average WDI 1987
ρ 0.055 Real interest rate US 3-month T-Bill 1970-2010 avg
α = m/c 0.22 Velocity parameter Sample average WDI 1987
qL 0.04 Probability of a crisis Laeven and Valencia (2013)
qH 0.5 Probability of crisis solution Laeven and Valencia (2013)
r 0 Minimum reserves as % of GDP Range -50% to 0%
Table 1: Baseline parameters for an average developing economy.
Two crucial parameters are the financing needs in the low and in the high
spending states. I normalize gL = 0, and take gH to be 10% of GDP . Table
2 presents available evidence of the fiscal costs of bailing out the banking
system in developing economies. The relevant cost for this exercise is the
amount accruing to the central bank, that needs to be financed with inflation
related revenues. Burnside et al. (2006) perform 3 case studies: Korea 1997-
2002, Mexico 1994-2002 and Turkey 2001-2002. They find that in these
three episodes total inflation-related financing up to 2002 was in present
value around 20% of pre-crisis GDP .14
Figure 5 shows the optimal inflation rate policy for the central bank as a
14These costs are in line with previous work on international reserves. Previous literature
has focused on output shocks and sudden stops of capital inflows. Jeanne and Ranciere
(2011) assume that a representative agent loses access to foreign debt of 10% of GDP
and suffers an output loss of 6.5% of trend GDP . Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009) assume an
output loss of 10% during a default crisis.
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Country Date of Estimate Fiscal cost of banking crises Inflation financed
Indonesia Nov. 99 65 -
Korea Dec. 99 24 22.3
Malaysia Dec. 99 22 -
Mexico Nov. 94 15 24
Thailand Jun. 99 35 -
Turkey Jan. 01 18 19.2
Table 2: Data from Burnside et al. (2001) and Burnside et al. (2006), present value, % of
pre-crisis GDP.
function of the amount of reserves using the baseline parameters described in
Table 1, and compares it to non-optimizing flexible inflation rates. The red
interior lines represent optimal policy, while the outer black lines represent
flexible policy. We can see that the optimal policy prescription is quite simple.
In a state of low expenditure the central bank implements an inflation rate
above the flexible policy, and therefore accumulates international reserves. If
a crisis hits and expenditure is high, the central bank increases the inflation
rate but less than what would be prescribed by a flexible policy. While a
crisis persists, the central bank is spending reserves. It will do so until it hits
the constraint. Then it is forced to increase the inflation rate and float the
exchange rate.
Figures 6 and 7 show the path of reserves and inflation/exchange rate
depreciation before and after a crisis. In Figure 6 it is possible to see that
in the absence of a crisis, reserves accumulate rather fast. In 20 years, they
approach 30% of GDP. The way accumulation is done is through a decreasing
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Figure 5: Optimal inflation rate as a function of reserves for baseline calibration.
inflation rate, which translates into a depreciating exchange rate. The reason
why inflation is negative is because as the central bank accumulates the
optimal stock of reserves it can approach its optimal policy: the Friedman
rule. This accumulation of assets does not come without costs. In this simple
model, any savings by the central bank directly reduces consumption.
Figure 7 shows the effect of crises on reserves, inflation and exchange
rates. This figure describes two crises. The first crisis hits in 1996 at a time
when reserves are high. For four years, inflation is larger and reserves go
down quickly. The second crisis hits in 2006, when reserves are low. Note
how this crisis is accompanied by a larger inflation rate relative to 1996. In
1996, the inflation rate was about 10%. In 2006, it immediately approached
20%. Larger inflation is associated with larger exchange rate depreciation.15
15Interestingly, looking at the banking crisis in 2007-08, Obstfeld et al. (2009) shows that
countries with larger international reserve holdings devalued their currencies less (and in
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Figure 6: Reserves and inflation rate on the reserve accumulation path.
4.2. Sources of variation and reserves in 2007
This section explores the determinants of the stock of international re-
serves suggested by the model. I simulate the model 1000 times and compute
average level of reserves depending on different parameter assumptions. Fig-
ure 8 shows a sensitivity analysis for variations in the borrowing constraint
of the central bank. The ability to borrow in the event of a crisis is also
an important difference between developed and developing economies. In
some cases even saw their currencies appreciate). Dominguez et al. (2012) shows that
countries drew from international reserves and allowed for some currency depreciation
following the 2007-08 banking crisis. What kept exchange rates from depreciating further
was the use of reserves. These authors argue that precautionary motives were behind this
decision, as a mercantilist policy would rather see the currency depreciate even more.
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the 2008 crisis, some central banks established swap lines between them, to
ensure liquidity of foreign currency in a period of distress. Central banks
in developing economies could not access these credit lines (Obstfeld et al.
(2009)). As expected, increased international borrowing by central banks is
associated with lower levels of international reserves, as shown in Figure 8.
The analysis so far has considered large and infrequent crisis. How do
these compare with costlier but less frequent crises? Figure 9 collects the
level of reserves after 20 years for different combinations of frequency and
size of crises. It shows that the existence of large reserves is the consequence
of large and infrequent crises. The larger the size of the crisis, the larger are
reserves. More frequent crises also increase reserves but at a decreasing rate.
This is intuitive, if crises are very frequent there is less of a role for reserves
as a smoothing policy.
To sum up, the quantitative analysis of the model shows that reserves
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adequacy should be measured with respect to the magnitude of the financing
needs and the ability to access contingent financing following a crisis.
4.3. Discussion
In this section I provided a quantitative illustration of the monetary per-
spective. This paper has argued that this perspective is useful to understand
the level of reserves observed in the data but it should be noted that both
the model and the quantitative exercise were simple and should be seen as
an introduction to the monetary perspective of reserve accumulation. I now
discuss some of the issues regarding the exercise and present some evidence
about the importance of the monetary perspective when studying reserves.
In the model all inflation related revenues take the form of seigniorage.
Burnside et al. (2006) argue that, at least for the cases of Korea, Mexico and
Turkey, only a limited part of the bailouts were financed through this means.
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They highlight the role of other inflation related revenues that I abstract from
in this paper: deflating nominal debt and an implicit devaluation; but also
fiscal reforms. If these other inflation related revenues are less costly than
seigniorage, then the exercise performed in this section would overestimate
reserves and inflation. At the same time, the costs used in the quantita-
tive exercise do not include the part financed with reserves, and therefore
underestimate the real amount financed by the central bank. Furthermore,
the model has no capital and featured log-utility. In a more sophisticated
model, there would be distortions associated with inflation that would in-
crease the costs associated with both accumulation of reserves and raising
inflation related revenues during a banking crisis.16
16See Rodrik (2006) for an estimation of the cost of reserves. Adding capital and moving
away from log-utility would also create a role for a Laffer curve for inflation. Currently, the
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I turn now to the question whether central banks accumulate international
reserves due to prospective spending needs and whether they use reserves to
support the banking sector during a banking crisis. This view is shared by
Dominguez et al. (2012), who highlight the role of international reserves as a
facility for a lender of last resort, as well as by Obstfeld et al (2010), who in-
terpret their finding that M2/GDP is correlated with international reserves
as evidence for reserves being held to support the financial sector. In the
Online Appendix C, I look at three interesting emerging economies that had
accumulated significant international reserves (in parentheses as % of GDP)
before the financial crisis of 2007: Brazil (13.13%), Russia (35.91%) and
Korea (24.98%); and analyze policies implemented in 2008. I find that inter-
national reserves were used in order to maintain financial stability, including
direct banking sector support. In the Online Appendix C, I also explore the
full cross-country evidence and test whether lagged size of the financial sec-
tor is correlated with the probability of experiencing a banking crisis. The
marginal effect of lagged size of the financial sector on the probability of ex-
periencing a banking crisis is positive and significant at the 5% level. These
results complement the results by Obstfeld et al. (2010). Together, they
describe a world where the amount of reserves held by the central bank is
calculated with respect to the size of the banking sector, and where larger
banking sectors are correlated with more frequent banking crises.
model is such that the consumer spends the same in consumption every period, regardless
of inflation. Therefore, the Laffer curve never slopes down.
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5. Conclusion and future research
In the last 20 years, central banks in developing economies have accumu-
lated an unprecedented level of international reserves. The level of reserves
in these countries now exceeds 25% of GDP if you include gold. This has
been puzzling for academics and policy makers. In this paper, I have ex-
plored a view where international reserve accumulation is the consequence of
long-run central bank policy. This monetary perspective contributes to our
understanding of this phenomenon in different dimensions.
First, it formalizes one motive for reserve accumulation by central banks.
I have argued that reserve adequacy should be measured with respect to
things that central banks do in developing economies: inflation and exchange
rate management and financial sector support during crises. Reserve accu-
mulation is the outcome of constrained optimal policy. Central banks weight
the costs of reserves against the benefits associated with avoiding massive
disruptions in their economies during crises. That is not to say that this
situation is desirable from a global perspective. Ultimately, international
reserve accumulation reflects the existence of large shocks, and the absence
or imperfection of international insurance markets. Two immediate policy
objectives follow from this analysis: reducing the magnitude of shocks, and
improving international insurance markets. Neither of these is trivial, but
the recent accumulation of international reserves should be understood with
these in the background.
Second, this view has predictions for the behavior of exchange rates that
are consistent with the data. Reserve accumulation in this paper is associated
with a depreciating currency. Also, during a crisis, the central bank uses
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reserves to fight depreciation. We observe the two in the data (see Levy-
Yeyati et al. (2013), Aizenman and Sun (2012), Dominguez et al. (2012) and
Obstfeld et al. (2009)). The first of these facts has been used to argue that
reserve accumulation is the unintended consequence of trade policy that tries
to promote exports and growth (Benigno and Fornaro (2012)). The relative
importance of trade and monetary policies remains an unresolved debate, as
discussed in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2010). But it is still noteworthy
that the monetary perspective can rationalize the two facts, which can guide
future empirical work on this important question.
Third, I have highlighted important factors behind the accumulation of
international reserves in different countries. The model predicts that dis-
tortions associated with inflation, the magnitude of crisis and how stringent
are central bank borrowing constraints, all determine the level of interna-
tional reserves in developing economies. This list is by no means exhaustive.
Future work could enrich the model to fully explore the heterogeneity of
reserve accumulation experiences across countries. It should also introduce
short-run considerations. Introducing nominal rigidities and breaking down
the purchasing power parity assumption would create short-run predictions
for exchange rates and reserves that could be tested.
Finally, this paper has focused on a world where exogenous banking crises
require the central bank to support the government and the financial sector.
Both assumptions can be endogeneized in a model a la Diamond and Dybvig
(1983). Central bank policies may affect directly the magnitude or likelihood
of banking crises, for example, through their effect on capital flows and the
fueling of asset bubbles. Introducing interactions between the central bank
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and the fiscal authority would highlight the co-movement of reserves, govern-
ment and private debt. In this paper, I have used a partial equilibrium, small
open economy model to introduce the monetary perspective on this impor-
tant question. This hardly exhausts the discussion on reserves, and should
be viewed as a complementary explanation to others discussed in this paper.
A thorough analysis of all these factors is essential to our understanding of
modern financial architecture, and remains an exciting field of research.
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